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“Accordingly, we reject the claim that the Sixth Amendment guarantees
a ‘meaningful relationship’ between an accused and his counsel.”
Chief Justice Burger in Morris v. Slappy (1983)1
“[T]he Sixth Amendment counsel of choice . . . commands, not that a
trial be fair, but that a particular guarantee of fairness be provided—to
wit, that the accused be defended by the counsel he believes to be best.”
Justice Scalia in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez (2006)2
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s generosity toward the criminal defendant’s right
to counsel has waxed and waned. It waxed in Gideon v. Wainwright3
and waned in Strickland v. Washington.4 Gideon promised every person,
black or white, rich or poor, the “guiding hand of counsel at every step
in the proceedings against him.”5 Strickland’s cramped definition of
“effective counsel,” however, meant that promise could be fulfilled with
a lawyer of the most minimal competence.6
Less discussed is the low point reached in Morris v. Slappy,7 where
the Court declared that the Sixth Amendment did not include “the right
to a meaningful attorney-client relationship.”8 That dictum was not
necessary to decide Slappy, but this spare outlook has dominated the
Court’s view of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice, a right
that is nonexistent for indigent defendants and limited for nonindigent
defendants.
However, in light of Justice Scalia’s recent and more generous view of
the right to counsel of choice in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez,9 it is
1. 461 U.S. 1, 14 (1983).
2. 126 S. Ct. 2557, 2562 (2006).
3. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
4. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
5. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 345 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68–69 (1932))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
6. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (setting out the two-part test—performance of
counsel and prejudice to the defendant); Vivian O. Berger, The Supreme Court and
Defense Counsel: Old Roads, New Paths—A Dead End?, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 9, 113
(1986) (“Altogether, the justices signaled an intent to shield at least appellate courts from
more than minimal involvement with claims of inadequate representation . . . .”). For
example, the standard is so low that the Fifth Circuit divided on whether a sleeping
lawyer could still be “effective.” See Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 338 (5th Cir.
2001) (en banc).
7. 461 U.S. 1 (1983).
8. Id. at 13.
9. 126 S. Ct. 2557 (2006).
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time to revisit the Court’s position in Slappy, an underrated and largely
ignored case, as well as the limited nature of the right to counsel of
choice in general. Gonzalez-Lopez’s narrow holding was that the erroneous
denial of the right to retained counsel of choice is structural error
requiring automatic reversal.10 More broadly, Justice Scalia professed that
the right to counsel of choice is not circumscribed by Strickland’s stingy
definition of “effective” counsel, as the Court had previously intimated,11
but has independent footing, implicitly encompassing the right to a
meaningful attorney-client relationship.
There is ample support for the notion that “a meaningful attorneyclient relationship” is not only contemplated by the Sixth Amendment,
but is the point of the right to counsel of choice.12 A client chooses a
lawyer with whom he or she can develop the bedrock principle of trust.
Without this trust, the relationship is indeed meaningless, and the client
will choose another attorney. When grounded in this reality, the right to
counsel of choice becomes more robust, for both the indigent and
nonindigent defendant.
While the Supreme Court has established that the right to retained
counsel of choice may be outweighed by countervailing interests, it has
never given lower courts guidance on how much weight to give the Sixth
Amendment right in the balancing.13 For nonindigent defendants, this
translates into giving trial courts broad discretion to deny counsel of
choice for reasons of administrative efficiency. Rarely, if ever, will an

10. Id. at 2566. This holding was not necessarily surprising, as most of the circuits
that had addressed the issue had used an automatic reversal standard. See Wayne D.
Holly, Rethinking the Sixth Amendment for the Indigent Criminal Defendant: Do
Reimbursement Statutes Support Recognition of a Right to Counsel of Choice for the
Indigent?, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 181, 186 n.28 (1998) (stating that the nearly uniform rule
among the courts of appeals which considered the question was that a defendant who has
been denied the right to counsel of choice need not show prejudice). See, e.g., Glasser v.
United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942) (finding that an unreasonable denial of right to
counsel of choice “may so offend our concept of the basic requirements of a fair hearing
as to amount to a denial of due process”); Wilson v. Mintzes, 761 F.2d 275, 281 (6th Cir.
1985) (“Evidence of unreasonable or arbitrary interference with an accused’s right to
counsel of choice ordinarily mandates reversal without a showing of prejudice.”).
11. See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988) (“[T]he essential aim of
the Amendment is to guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal defendant rather
than to ensure that a defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom he
prefers.”).
12. See infra notes 93–111 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 24–30 and accompanying text.
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appellate court disturb a trial court’s denial of a continuance when weighing
the court’s calendar against the right to counsel of choice.14
For indigent defendants, since they have no right to counsel of choice,
a trial court can deny a defendant’s motion to continue the trial in order
to allow his appointed counsel to stay on the case, thereby severing an
ongoing attorney relationship. In that circumstance, according to the Court
in Slappy, there are no constitutional rights involved.15
This Article takes its lead from the core principles of the right to
counsel of choice expressed in Gonzalez-Lopez.16 These principles
indicate that the right should include an indigent defendant’s right to
continue an attorney-client relationship established at some point in the
past, and that, for both nonindigent and indigent defendants, the right to
continue a trial with counsel of choice must be honored by trial courts
unless it would be unethical or manifestly unjust to do so. This means
that trial courts must almost always grant a continuance to accommodate
that choice and could rarely deny such a request for reasons of administrative
convenience or docket control.
Part II gives the reader a history of the development of the Court’s
jurisprudence in the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice. The
history shows that the right is restricted by one’s ability to pay for that
counsel, and that the Court has placed limits on even the rich man’s
choice in certain situations. Part III positions the indigent defendant in
Slappy in this history and describes the case in some detail. The detail is
necessary to show the Court’s hostility toward Joseph Slappy, whether
owing to his poverty, his crime, or his nerve in standing up for himself.
After describing the Court’s rejection of a right to a meaningful
attorney-client relationship, Part IV demonstrates that such a right,
adequately defined, is inherent in our adversary system of justice and
that a defendant’s right to counsel incorporates this right. Finally, Part V
looks closely at the Court’s most recent description of the right to
counsel of choice in Gonzalez-Lopez. The opinion suggests that Sixth
Amendment right to counsel jurisprudence needs to be revisited and
revised to give both the indigent and nonindigent defendant a stronger
constitutional interest in an ongoing attorney-client relationship.
II. THE RIGHT TO RETAINED COUNSEL OF CHOICE
The origins of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of one’s choosing
are murky, at best. Certainly, it is not contained in the words of the
14.
15.
16.
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Amendment itself, which guarantee that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel
for his defence.”17 Historically, the right to counsel developed as a right
that inured only to the wealthy defendants, as they had the means to
bring counsel to trial with them, and, of course, they brought counsel of
their choosing.18 Hence, when the Supreme Court in Powell v. Alabama
stated that “[i]t is hardly necessary to say that, the right to counsel being
conceded, a defendant should be afforded a fair opportunity to secure
counsel of his own choice,” this meant no more than that someone who
could afford a lawyer should be given time to get one.19
However, Powell was not a case about right to counsel of choice.20
The Court did not have a real opportunity to recognize this right directly
until 1988, in Wheat v. United States.21 Shortly before his trial, Mark
Wheat wanted to substitute his own retained counsel with Eugene
Iredale, a well-known, successful defense attorney, who had already
orchestrated good results for two of his codefendants.22 All three
defendants executed waivers of any conflicts of interest in the multiple
representation by Iredale.23

17. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
18. See Alfredo Garcia, The Right to Counsel Under Siege: Requiem for an
Endangered Right?, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 35, 41–42 (1991) (explaining that, at the time
of enactment, the Sixth Amendment only meant the right to retain counsel of choice at
one’s expense).
19. 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932).
20. In Powell, six African American men—the “Scottsboro boys,” as they were
called—were accused of the capital offense of raping two white women. DAN T.
CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH 247–48 (Oxford Univ.
Press 1971) (1969). On the day of trial, a member of the bar offered in a very casual
manner to help in representation of the men. See Powell, 287 U.S. at 56 (describing the
appointment of counsel as “little more than an expansive gesture”). Given the timing,
the number of defendants, the “hanging” atmosphere, and the seriousness of the offense,
the issue was one of adequate representation more than counsel of choice. See Eugene
L. Shapiro, The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel of Choice: An Exercise in the
Weighing of Unarticulated Values, 43 S.C. L. REV. 345, 345–46 (1992) (stating that the
first strong mention of the right was in Powell, and even that mention was only
peripheral).
21. 486 U.S. 153 (1988).
22. See id. at 155 (describing the two favorable results); id. at 170 (noting Iredale’s
“fantastic job” on behalf of one of the codefendants) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Pamela S.
Karlan, Discrete and Relational Criminal Representation: The Changing Vision of the
Right to Counsel, 105 HARV. L. REV. 670, 687 n.79 (1992) (noting Iredale was recognized as
a “superstar”).
23. Wheat, 486 U.S. at 156.
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A bare majority of the Supreme Court found that while Wheat should
be given a presumption in favor of counsel of his choice, the presumption
was overcome by the showing of “a serious potential for conflict.”24
Justice Rehnquist justified the qualification of the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel of choice by noting:
[W]hile the right to select and be represented by one’s preferred attorney is
comprehended by the Sixth Amendment, the essential aim of the Amendment is
to guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal defendant rather than to
ensure that a defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom he
prefers.25

Justice Rehnquist implied that the right to counsel of choice, if denied,
could never be remedied as long as the defendant received effective
assistance of counsel at trial. Hence, the majority did not endorse a very
robust Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice.
The Wheat Court also gave little weight to the right to counsel of
choice in the balancing process. The Court rejected the defendant’s
claim that the waivers by all three defendants cured the conflict, stating
that “institutional interests in the rendition of just verdicts in criminal
cases” may override the defendant’s interests.26 Those interests include
“ensuring that criminal trials are conducted within the ethical standards
of the profession,”27 ensuring that “the legal proceedings appear fair to
all who observe them,”28 and “the legitimate wish of district courts that
their judgment remain intact on appeal.”29 This broad language has done
little to guide lower courts on how much weight to give the right to
counsel of choice in the balance.30
A year later, in Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, the
Court again recognized the defendant’s “right to retain counsel of his
choosing” and his “‘right to spend his own money to obtain the advice

24. Id. at 164. The alleged conflicts were far from realizable, and it was apparent
to observers that the government did not want to deal with the potency of Eugene
Iredale. In dissent, Justices Stevens and Blackmun contended that the Court held “a
paternalistic view of the citizen’s right to select his or her own lawyer,” “greatly
exaggerate[d] the significance of the potential conflict,” and gave “inadequate weight to
the informed and voluntary character of the clients’ waiver of their right to conflict-free
representation,” ignoring the fact that independent counsel had advised Wheat concerning the
wisdom of a waiver. Id. at 172 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Scholars have written about and
recognized the falsity of the government’s claims of potential harmful conflicts in
Wheat. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, “Through a Glass, Darkly”: How the Court Sees
Motions to Disqualify Criminal Defense Lawyers, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1201, 1262 (1989).
25. Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159.
26. Id. at 160.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 161.
30. See Shapiro, supra note 20, at 350 (making the same point).
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and assistance . . . of counsel.’”31 Like Wheat, however, Caplin & Drysdale
upheld a limitation on the right.32 The majority upheld a restriction on
the defendant’s ability to retain counsel of his choice due to a federal
asset forfeiture provision that reduced a defendant’s available funds to
pay a lawyer.33 Justice White, for the bare majority, reasoned that a
“defendant has no Sixth Amendment right to spend another person’s
money for services rendered by an attorney, even if those funds are the
only way that defendant will be able to retain the attorney of his
choice.”34
As in Wheat, the Court was sharply divided. The dissent in Caplin &
Drysdale articulated the basic underlying values of the right that support
a more robust right to counsel of choice. Justice Blackmun argued that
the right plays a “distinct role . . . in protecting the integrity of the judicial
process, a role that makes ‘the right to be represented by privately retained
counsel . . . the primary, preferred component of the basic right,’”35 it
“foster[s] the trust between attorney and client that is necessary for the
attorney to be a truly effective advocate,”36 and it assures “some
modicum of equality between the Government and those it chooses to
prosecute.”37 These principles, including a formulation of a meaningful
attorney-client relationship, would logically apply to indigent defendants
as well, but the Court has yet to make that application.38
Following Wheat and Caplin & Drysdale, lower courts consistently hold
that the right to a retained lawyer of one’s choosing “can be circumscribed
by a sufficient overriding interest of the judicial system.”39 Because the
Court did not give guidance as to how much weight to give the right to
31. 491 U.S. 617, 626 (1989) (quoting Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation
Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 370 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
32. Id. at 624–25.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 626. For a criticism of the Court’s treatment of the right to counsel in
Caplin & Drysdale, see Garcia, supra note 18, at 87 (“[T]he Caplin Court left no doubt
about its predilections: it thoroughly concurred with legislative efforts to deprive
defendants charged with major drug offenses of their ability to hire private attorneys.”);
id. at 86 (“The Court’s jurisprudence in this sphere is seriously flawed, reflecting its
strong preference for crime control and efficiency imperatives and its corresponding
depreciation of the critical role of the defense attorney in the criminal process.”).
35. Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 645 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 646.
38. See discussion infra Part III.
39. 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.4(c), at 557 (2d ed.
1999).
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counsel of choice, courts have readily denied counsel of choice when it
interferes with the trial court’s effective administration of justice in
controlling its own docket. Appellate courts give the trial courts wide
latitude in exercising their discretion to grant or deny the continuances
requested by defendants to accommodate chosen counsel’s schedules.40
Such an unchecked ability to sever the ongoing relationship between a
defendant and his chosen attorney suggests that the right to counsel of
choice is fairly low on the hierarchy of Sixth Amendment rights.41
In this context, a trial court’s denial of a continuance request by an
indigent defendant, which effectively severed the defendant’s ongoing
relationship with his appointed lawyer, and the subsequent affirmance by
the Supreme Court in Slappy, likely appeared unremarkable at the time.
III. SITUATING MORRIS V. SLAPPY
Just as it has always been assumed since the adoption of the Sixth
Amendment that a defendant has a right to retained counsel of his
choice, it has also always been assumed that the indigent defendant has
no correlative right to counsel of his choosing.42 While the Court
expanded the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to indigent defendants
in Gideon v. Wainwright,43 the right to counsel of choice was not also
extended.44 Once Gideon effectively created an appointed counsel system,
40. See Holly, supra note 10, at 191–92 & nn.58–59 (1998) (observing that
appellate courts give trial courts “wide discretion to . . . grant or deny continuance . . . to
(i) accommodate a defendant’s chosen counsel’s scheduling conflict or illness, or (ii) to
provide a defendant with additional time to obtain new counsel,” and citing cases). See
also LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 39, § 11.4(c), at 559 n.44, 560 n.46 (citing cases
demonstrating that the right to counsel of choice “may not be insisted upon in a manner
that will obstruct an orderly procedure in courts of justice and deprive such courts of
their inherent powers to control the same”).
41. Judge Posner described the reduced status of the right to counsel of choice as
follows:
That a district judge has a broad discretion to extinguish the right to counsel of
one’s choice for reasons of calendar control suggests that this right, which in
any event no indigent criminal defendant has, is, like the right to effective
assistance of counsel (a right whose vindication requires proof of prejudice),
not so fundamental as the rights protected by the rule of automatic reversal.
United States v. Santos, 201 F.3d 953, 960 (7th Cir. 2000).
42. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 39, § 11.4(a), at 550 n.2 (citing cases stating the
indigent defendant has no right to counsel of choice); Holly, supra note 10, at 197 n.91
(same).
43. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
44. Ironically, in retrospect, on remand from Gideon, the trial court deferred to
Gideon’s choice of appointed counsel. Abe Fortas had enlisted a prominent trial lawyer
to represent him, the prosecution suggested a public defender, and Gideon asked for a
particular local attorney. Gideon’s wish was granted. Brief for the Respondent at 21,
United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557 (2006) (No. 05-352), 2006 WL
838892 (citing ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON’S TRUMPET 237–38 (Vintage Books 1989)
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appellate courts upheld trial judges’ complete discretion to appoint any
competent attorney they chose for an indigent defendant, regardless of
the defendant’s preferences.45
There is a lively debate about whether the justifications traditionally
given are adequate to deny indigent defendants a Sixth Amendment right
to counsel of choice. According to Professor Wayne LaFave, one of the
justifications is an assumption that judges are better able to choose an
attorney than the indigent defendant “because they know the abilities of
the available local counsel.”46 A second justification is a concern that
allowing defendants to choose will disrupt the “even handed distribution
of assignments” by imposing a substantial burden on the more experienced
attorneys and giving an advantage to repeat offenders, who are most
likely to know and select those attorneys.47 Both of these rationales have
been roundly criticized as inadequate,48 and scholars have called for a
system that allows for choice in the initial appointment.49
(1964)) (“That the trial judge deferred to Gideon’s choice shows the continued vitality of
the original understanding that the assistance of counsel involved a defendant’s choice
and not simply the presence of some attorney at his trial.”).
45. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 39, § 11.4(a), at 550. This is mirrored by the rules
regarding substitution of counsel: an indigent defendant has no right to replace one
appointed counsel with another and has a right to substitution only upon establishing
“good cause, such as conflict of interest, a complete breakdown of communication, or an
irreconcilable conflict which [could] lead . . . to an apparently unjust verdict.” Id.
§ 11.4(b), at 555. Mere loss of confidence in one’s attorney is not “good cause,” and the
defendant cannot insist upon new counsel because he does not like the appointed
counsel’s “attitude,” association with the prosecutor, or approach on matters of strategy.
Id.
46. Id. §11.4(a), at 550.
47. Id. §11.4(a), at 550–51. Professor LaFave gives a third justification: since the
Sixth Amendment guarantees the defendant a right only to representation that is
competent, and not to that representation that he believes—correctly or not—to be the
best, the trial court may value over the defendant’s choice the administrative convenience of
an appointment system that ignores defendant’s preference. Id. Importantly, however,
the Supreme Court in Gonzalez-Lopez rejects this rationale. See discussion infra Part V.
48. See Holly, supra note 10, at 201–15 (arguing the inadequacy of each of the
three rationales); Norman Lefstein, In Search of Gideon’s Promise: Lessons from
England and the Need for Federal Help, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 835, 918 (2004) (same); Peter
W. Tague, An Indigent’s Right to the Attorney of His Choice, 27 STAN. L. REV. 73, 80,
89–95 (1974) (same).
49. See, e.g., Holly, supra note 10, at 225 (advocating a presumption in favor of
accommodating an indigent defendant’s choice from among a panel of attorneys
rendering public defender assistance, and that courts should consider efficiency, reasons
for the defendant’s choice, and availability of counsel); Lefstein, supra note 48, at 918
(arguing in favor of preferring an indigent defendant’s choice, as is done in England);
Tague, supra note 48, at 99 (“The importance to the indigent of choosing his attorney is
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Putting that debate aside for the moment, there is a narrower Sixth
Amendment right contained within the right to counsel of choice that is
at issue whenever a trial court severs an ongoing attorney-client relationship.
Much less debatable, it would seem, is whether the justice system can
and should give preference to such an ongoing relationship. When
Joseph Slappy’s case made its way to the Supreme Court, he was not
asking for a blanket right to counsel of choice, but was simply asking to
continue his trial with his appointed lawyer.50 Like Clarence Gideon and
Anthony Faretta before him, Joseph Slappy hoped that the Court would
champion the rights and dignity of the indigent criminal defendant. He
was terribly wrong.
Joseph Slappy was charged in San Francisco Superior Court with rape,
forcible oral copulation, robbery, burglary, and false imprisonment.51
The prosecution contended that Slappy accosted the female victim in a
grocery store, was kicked out of the store by the manager, threw a beer
bottle at the victim when she left the store, and was waiting for her in the
lobby of her apartment building when she arrived. Slappy then forced
her into the basement where he raped and sodomized her, and then
robbed her. The victim gave the police a description and the police
apprehended Slappy two blocks away, wearing the “Afro” wig and the
green fatigue jacket with a fur-trimmed hood that the victim had
described. The police found the victim’s jewelry on Slappy’s person and
a button from his jacket on the basement floor of the apartment building,
along with the victim’s scattered clothing.52 Suffice it to say, this was a
serious, and ugly, case.
Because Joseph Slappy was indigent, the court appointed the San
Francisco Public Defender’s office to represent him.53 Deputy Public
Defender Harvey Goldfine was assigned to the case. It is unclear when
the assignment occurred, but the offense date was July 7, 1976, and
Slappy was arrested the same day. Goldfine represented Slappy at least
as early as the preliminary hearing and then supervised “an extensive

clear: improvement in the attorney-client relationship, representation by an able attorney
who will fight aggressively for him, and the likelihood of greater participation in
structuring his defense.”); Kenneth P. Troccoli, “I Want a Black Lawyer to Represent
Me”: Addressing a Black Defendant’s Concerns with Being Assigned a White CourtAppointed Lawyer, 20 LAW & INEQ. 1, 48 (2002) (arguing that an indigent defendant
should be given the option to select his own lawyer and the court should appoint the
lawyer provided he or she is available, willing, and conflict-free).
50. See Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 6–9 (1983).
51. Id. at 5 n.1.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 5.
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investigation.”54 The trial was scheduled for September 23, 1976, but
Goldfine was hospitalized for emergency surgery shortly before trial.55
Six days before the trial date, the Public Defender’s office reassigned
the case to Bruce Hotchkiss, a senior trial attorney in the office.56 In
those six days, Hotchkiss met with Slappy once at his jail cell to tell him
he would be representing him, and then one more time before trial.57 On
the day of trial, Slappy said to the trial court, “I have only had this P.D.
[Public Defender] for a day and a half, we have not had time to prepare
this case.”58 Hotchkiss, on the other hand, stated, “I feel that I am prepared.
My own feeling is that a further continuance would not benefit me in
presenting the case.”59 Slappy said that he was “satisfied with the Public
Defender, but it’s just no way, no possible way, that he has had enough
time to prepare this case.”60 The court construed this as a motion to continue
and denied it, accentuating that Hotchkiss had had the case for six
days.61
On the second day of trial, Slappy repeated his concerns that
Hotchkiss had not had time to prepare the case and said, “Mr. Harvey
Goldfine was my attorney, he was my attorney, and he still is . . . . Mr.
Harvey Goldfine didn’t even have enough time to go over my case with
me . . . .”62 On the third day of trial, Slappy filed a pro se petition for a
writ of habeas corpus, claiming he was unrepresented by counsel.63 He
argued that “my attorney’s in the hospital, and I don’t legally have no
attorney, and this P.D. here told me . . . I didn’t have no defense to my
charges.”64 Hotchkiss denied this latter statement, and the trial court
treated Slappy’s petition as a renewal of the motion to continue and
denied it.65 Thereafter, Slappy sat through his trial but did not
54. Id. at 5.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Slappy v. Morris, 649 F.2d 718, 719 (9th Cir. 1981), rev’d, 461 U.S. 1 (1983).
58. Slappy, 461 U.S. at 6. From Slappy’s point of view, it is a day and a half
because his first real interview with Hotchkiss was just on the Tuesday before the trial
began on Thursday. Id.
59. Id. Mr. Hotchkiss’s choice to go to trial against his client’s wishes and without
spending the time necessary to establish a relationship with Slappy are inexcusable and
potentially unethical. See discussion infra notes 95–99 and accompanying text.
60. Slappy, 461 U.S. at 6.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 7–8.
63. Id. at 8.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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participate or testify.66 At one point, the following colloquy between the
judge and Slappy occurred:
THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, I’m leaving that part up to you. I
asked you may I be excused. If you don’t want to excuse me, I’ll sit
right here. What difference does it make?
THE COURT: Well, I would urge you then Mr. Slappy to remain
seated and in the Courtroom, and should you desire to discuss this
case further with your Counsel, why you certainly can let me know,
or through your Counsel let me know.
THE DEFENDANT: What do I have to say to get through to you,
your Honor, what do I have to say to make you understand. I have
told you two or three times and then you keep telling me about
talking to my Counsel. I don’t have no attorney . . . . [M]y
attorney’s name is Mr. P.D. Goldfine, Harvey Goldfine, that’s my
attorney, he’s in the hospital.
THE COURT: Well, I am going to ask you then under the
circumstances, Mr. Slappy, to remain in the Courtroom and to listen
to the proceedings and listen to the progress of this case.
THE DEFENDANT: [T]hat’s up to you what you do, your Honor.
If you say so I’ll remain here, but I am not participating in the trial,
I’m through with it, as of now I am through with this trial. I was
through with it the 24th when this P.D. told me that I didn’t have no
defense from my charges. I was through then, and that’s why I
didn’t see him when he come down to see me.67
Slappy was convicted of robbery, burglary, and false imprisonment, but
the jury hung on rape and forcible oral copulation.68
The second trial on the two sexual assault charges took place a week
later. Slappy refused to cooperate or even speak with Hotchkiss. Again,
he refused to take the stand, against Hotchkiss’s advice. He was
convicted of both sexual assault charges this time.69
Slappy’s pro se writ of habeas corpus wound its way to the United
States Supreme Court.70 Whereas Clarence Gideon is haled as a hero for
fighting for the right to counsel all the way to the Supreme Court, Joseph
Slappy’s efforts toward recognition for his plight were treated by Chief
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
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Justice Burger with disdain, if not contempt.71 The majority of the Court
had no sympathy for a man in his position, even as he was without
funds, accused of a heinous crime, and without the “guiding hand” of a
lawyer he trusted.72 Chief Justice Burger described Slappy’s “What do I
have to say to get through to you” comment to the trial judge as a
renewed “attack” on the judge.73 A more sympathetic observer would
have described Slappy’s words as courageous and admirable attempts by
a pro se litigant to maintain his position and his dignity amidst the utter
abandonment of his concerns by Bruce Hotchkiss and the trial judge.
The Court’s attitude toward the efforts of Joseph Slappy is notably the
opposite of the Court’s attitude toward Anthony Faretta eight years
earlier.74 Anthony Faretta was charged with grand theft and requested
that he be allowed to represent himself.75 The Court was all too willing
to give Anthony Faretta every benefit of the doubt in granting his
wishes, emphasizing that “[t]he right to defend is given directly to the
accused; for it is he who suffers the consequences if the defense fails.”76
Further, “[a]n unwanted counsel ‘represents’ the defendant only through
a tenuous and unacceptable legal fiction. Unless the accused has
acquiesced in such representation, the defense presented is not the
defense guaranteed him by the Constitution, for, in a very real sense, it is
not his defense.”77 Alas, while those noble phrases are equally applicable to
Joseph Slappy, they only apply to a man willing “to make a fool of
himself,” for “one who is his own lawyer has a fool for a client.”78 Ironically,

71. See infra notes 73 and 82 and accompanying text; see also Slappy, 461 U.S. at
12 (describing Slappy’s refusal to cooperate with Hotchkiss as “adamant–even
contumacious”); Berger, supra note 6, at 49 (“[F]ive justices . . . had managed to denigrate
both defense attorney and client, and to do so in a wholly gratuitous fashion.”).
72. See Berger, supra note 6, at 50 (finding that, in Slappy, the Court “reached out
to disparage generally the importance of the bond between an accused and his attorney.
Their doing so, moreover, in the setting of a poor man’s prosecution revealed a total
insensitivity to the special disadvantages of pauper defendants caught in the toils of
assembly-line justice.”).
73. It is worth noting that Burger excerpted only that one comment from Slappy
from the fuller colloquy quoted by the Ninth Circuit and recited in this Article. Of
course, out of context, that statement may appear ruder and more abrupt to the reader.
74. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
75. Id. at 807.
76. Id. at 819–20.
77. Id. at 821.
78. Id. at 852 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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then, Joseph Slappy only could have won the Court’s approval if he was
foolish enough to represent himself.79
Further, Slappy, who was essentially pro se in his presentation to the
court, was expected to make his arguments with precision. Because
Slappy framed his complaints as Hotchkiss not being ready, and did not
express dissatisfaction with Hotchkiss himself until “midtrial,”80 all nine
members of the Court agreed that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in denying a continuance.81 Further, while there was no evidence in the
record of any dishonesty,82 Chief Justice Burger surmised that the trial
court “could reasonably have concluded that respondent’s belated
requests to be represented by Goldfine were not made in good faith but
were a transparent ploy for a delay.”83
79. Professor Garcia notes that “the dignitary values Faretta safeguarded were
scorned in Slappy,” Garcia, supra note 18, at 96, and further:
Since rendering its opinion in Faretta . . . the Court has been loath to recognize
the crucial dignitary norms promoted by the right to counsel. Rather, the Court
has devalued the critical link between the defendant’s dignity and the
attorney’s role in preserving and safeguarding the client’s autonomy against
the government.
Id. at 92. Professor Tague also emphasizes:
It is ironic that judges so jealously guard the power to select an indigent’s
attorney while granting so much freedom to other aspects of the relationship
between a criminal defendant and his attorney. Traditionally the courts have
found that a defendant has an interest in defending himself in whatever way he
considers best, using whatever resources are legitimately available to him,
regardless of the consequences.
Tague, supra note 48, at 84–85.
80. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 13 (1983).
81. See id. at 12; id. at 18 (Brennan, J., concurring); id.at 29 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
82. The Ninth Circuit had noted that there was no evidence in the record of bad
faith on the part of Joseph Slappy in making his request. Slappy v. Morris, 649 F.2d
718, 722 (9th Cir. 1981), rev’d, 461 U.S. 1 (1983). Chief Justice Burger cites to no
evidence, but simply recites the State’s contention that it was bad faith. Slappy, 461 U.S.
at 11 n.4.
83. Slappy, 461 U.S. at 13. Inexplicably, Chief Justice Burger continued, “In our
view, the record shows that the trial judge exhibited sensitive concern for the rights of
the accused and extraordinary patience with a contumacious litigant.” Id. Rather, the
record showed a trial court allowing substitute counsel to step in on a very serious felony
case only six days before trial and over the defendant’s firm and unwavering objection.
Id. at 5–9.
Consistent with Burger’s negative view of Slappy is the finding that “judges in
the criminal justice system appear to rely on their own, often skeptical, presumptions
regarding a criminal defendant’s or his lawyer’s motivations for alleging a breakdown in
the lawyer-client relationship” when ruling on motions to substitute counsel. Lindsay R.
Goldstein, Note, A View from the Bench: Why Judges Fail to Protect Trust and
Confidence in the Lawyer-Client Relationship—An Analysis and Proposal for Reform,
73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2665, 2700 (2005). Goldstein’s review of the judiciary’s response
to motions to withdraw or substitute counsel in civil and criminal cases suggests:
[D]espite some congruence in judges’ approaches to breakdowns in the
lawyer-client relationship, judges in the criminal context seem more likely to
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Before Joseph Slappy’s writ reached the Supreme Court, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals had decided that his writ should be granted if
he was not given a new trial on all five counts.84 The Court of Appeals
found that, while “an indigent defendant does not have an unqualified
right to the appointment of counsel of his own choosing,” he does have a
Sixth Amendment right to “a meaningful attorney-client relationship.”85
The trial court ignored this right by failing to conduct a balancing test
weighing Slappy’s interest in continued representation by Goldfine
against the State’s interest in proceeding with the scheduled trial.86
Indeed, the trial court had not inquired at all into the expected length of
Goldfine’s unavailability. Hence, the appellate court said the violation
of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel required automatic reversal,
without a showing of prejudice.87
Chief Justice Burger, writing for five members of the Court, scoffed
at the notion that the Sixth Amendment contains a right to a meaningful
attorney-client relationship.88 He dismissed the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in
one short paragraph, stating simply that it is “without basis in the law.”89
Because the indigent defendant has no right to counsel of choice, the
reject even a worthy motion to withdraw or substitute counsel. The apparent
result of this disparate treatment is that trust and confidence in the lawyerclient relationship receives less protection in the criminal justice system than in
civil litigation.
Id. at 2681–82.
84. Slappy, 461 U.S. at 11.
85. Slappy, 649 F.2d at 720.
86. The Ninth Circuit stated:
Because of the importance of the attorney-client relationship to the substance
of the defendant’s sixth amendment right to counsel, we hold that the sixth
amendment (as incorporated by the fourteenth amendment) encompasses the
right to have the trial judge accord weight to that relationship in determining
whether to grant a continuance founded on the temporary unavailability of a
defendant’s particular attorney. In considering the continuance, the trial court
must balance the defendant’s constitutional right to counsel against the societal
interest in the “prompt and efficient administration of justice.”
Id. at 721 (quoting Gandy v. Alabama, 569 F.2d 1318, 1323 (5th Cir. 1978)).
87. Slappy, 461 U.S. at 11.
88. Although the Court was unanimous in the judgment, all agreeing that the
denial of the defendant’s motion for a continuance was well within the court’s discretion,
Justice Brennan’s concurrence, joined by Justice Marshall, disagreed with the Court’s
conclusion denying a right to a meaningful attorney-client relationship. Id. at 15
(Brennan, J., concurring). Justices Blackmun and Stevens wrote separately to argue that
the Court should not have addressed the Sixth Amendment issue. Id. at 29 (Blackmun,
J., concurring).
89. Id. at 13 (majority opinion).
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Court treated the issue as simply a matter of a judge’s broad discretion to
grant or deny a continuance.90 Of course, this discretion was not abused
because substitute counsel Hotchkiss said he was ready for trial.91
While not directly deciding the issue, a majority of the Supreme Court
did not appear sympathetic to recognizing a right to continue an ongoing
attorney-client relationship. As argued by Professor Alfredo Garcia, “The
cumulative impact of Slappy, Wheat, and Caplin is to abridge the
defendant’s dignitary interest in counsel who will be perceived as
effective and who will foster the defendant’s belief in the legitimacy of
the criminal process.”92
IV. THE RIGHT TO A MEANINGFUL ATTORNEY-CLIENT
RELATIONSHIP
The concept of a Sixth Amendment “right to a meaningful attorneyclient relationship” was obviously too vague for the Supreme Court to
embrace in Slappy.93 However, like all of the rights enumerated in the
Sixth Amendment, the right simply needs defining parameters. One
concrete aspect of the right that can be easily embraced and defined is a
Sixth Amendment right to continue an ongoing relationship with
counsel, whether appointed or retained.94 The right to retained counsel
of choice is supported by three basic tenets of our adversary system:
trust, autonomy, and fairness. Those three precepts apply equally to
recognition of a Sixth Amendment right of any defendant to continue a
relationship with counsel without undue interference from the trial court.
First, the development of trust between the attorney and her client is
well recognized by the courts and ethical rules as “the cornerstone of the
adversary system”95 and a primary rationale behind the right to counsel

90. Id. at 11–12.
91. Id. at 12.
92. Garcia, supra note 18, at 98.
93. See Slappy, 461 U.S. at 13–14.
94. Justices Brennan and Marshall, concurring in Slappy, agreed with the Ninth
Circuit that, while an indigent defendant has no right to choose his appointed counsel, he
does have a right to continued representation by the attorney appointed to represent him
and with whom he has developed a relationship. Slappy, 461 U.S. at 20–21 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
95. Linton v. Perini, 656 F.2d 207, 212 (6th Cir. 1981) (“Basic trust between
counsel and defendant is the cornerstone of the adversary system and effective assistance
of counsel.”). See also ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION
FUNCTION & DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 4-3.1(a) (1993) (“Defense counsel should seek
to establish a relationship of trust and confidence with the accused . . . .”); MODEL RULES
OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (2007) (stating that trust is “the hallmark of the clientlawyer relationship”).
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of choice.96 If the client trusts his lawyer, the quality of representation is
vastly increased. An effective defense at trial, the negotiation of a good
plea bargain, and the development of mitigating evidence for sentencing
all require the full cooperation of the client.97 A trusting client is far
more likely to reveal facts and details that not only help in formulating
the defense, but, in the absence of broad discovery rules, help the
attorney learn more about the prosecution’s case.98 The ethical rules

96. See, e.g., United States v. Panzardi Alvarez, 816 F.2d 813, 816 (1st Cir. 1987)
(“The denial of a defendant’s right to choose his own counsel jeopardizes his sixth
amendment guarantees because ‘a substantial risk [arises] that the basic trust between
counsel and client, which is a cornerstone of the adversary system, would be undercut.’”)
(alteration in original) (citation omitted).
97. Professor Anne Bowen Poulin notes that:
Counsel’s view of the defendant, as well as the defendant’s trust or mistrust of
counsel, plays a role in determining the course of the defendant’s representation.
Thus, the relationship between the defendant and counsel plays a critical role
in ensuring the defendant’s proper involvement in the proceedings and will be
enhanced if based on the defendant’s desire to begin or maintain that
relationship.
Anne Bowen Poulin, Strengthening the Criminal Defendant’s Right to Counsel, 28
CARDOZO L. REV. 1213, 1250–51 (2006).
98. See Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. at 20–21 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(“Counsel is provided to assist the defendant in presenting his defense, but in order to do
so effectively the attorney must work closely with the defendant in formulating defense
strategy. This may require the defendant to disclose embarrassing and intimate
information to his attorney.”). The Ninth Circuit expressed a similar view in Slappy v.
Morris, noting that:
The attorney-client relationship involves ‘an intimate process of consultation
and planning which culminates in a state of trust and confidence between the
client and his attorney.’ Often, the outcome of a criminal trial may hinge upon
the extent to which the defendant is able to communicate to his attorney the
most intimate and embarrassing details of his personal life. Complete candor
in attorney-client consultations may disclose defenses or mitigating circumstances
that defense counsel would not otherwise have uncovered. At the very least,
an open exchange between attorney and client will often foreclose the possibility of
surprise at trial.
649 F.2d 718, 720 (9th Cir. 1981), rev’d, 461 U.S. 1 (1983) (citation omitted). The ABA
Standards emphasize the importance of trust, stating:
Nothing is more fundamental to the lawyer-client relationship than the
establishment of trust and confidence. Without it, the client may withhold
essential information from the lawyer. Thus, important evidence may not be
obtained, valuable defenses neglected, and, perhaps most significant, defense
counsel may not be forewarned of evidence that may be presented by the
prosecution.
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION & DEFENSE FUNCTION
Standard 4-3.1 cmt. (1993).
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guiding criminal defense attorneys expect and require the development
of this trusting relationship.99
Trust also means that the defendant is far more likely to follow his
lawyer’s advice and instincts.100 Representing a criminal defendant is a
treacherous balancing act. A good lawyer is sometimes tough with the
prosecution, and sometimes cooperative with the prosecution, depending
upon what is best for the client. A good lawyer tries to persuade his
client to plead guilty when, in his or her professional opinion, a plea will
produce a better outcome. A good lawyer persuades his client not to
testify when it will reveal damaging prior convictions. If the client does
not trust his lawyer, the client’s instincts will tell him to fight the lawyer
at every step. Representation, and likely the outcome, will suffer. There
is no way to know whether Harvey Goldfine would have been able to
produce a better result for Joseph Slappy, but with his client’s cooperation,
Goldfine would have had a much better chance than Hotchkiss.
A defendant who is able to choose and hire his lawyer is far more
likely to trust that attorney than a defendant who cannot afford a lawyer
and has one appointed by the court.101 There is good reason for this
99. The ABA Standards, standards to which the Court has “long . . . referred ‘as
guides to determining what is reasonable’” in determining competency of representation,
set out duties of counsel which would be all but impossible without a trusting
relationship with the client. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003) (quoting
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)). For example, because “[t]he client
is usually the lawyer’s primary source of information for an effective defense,” counsel
is charged with seeking to know “all relevant facts known to the accused” as soon as
practicable. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION & DEFENSE
FUNCTION Standard 4-3.2(a) & cmt. (1993). Counsel must keep the client informed of
developments and progress, id. Standard 4-3.8(a), give explanations to the extent
necessary to help the client make informed decisions, id. Standard 4-3.8(b), urge the
client to take professional advice, id. Standard 4-5.2(a) & cmt., involve the client in plea
discussions, id. Standard 4-5.2(a), and develop and raise mitigating factors both to the
prosecutor initially and to the court at sentencing, id. Standard 4-4.1 cmt. The ABA
Standards admit that confidence of the client in his lawyer is critical and that chosen
counsel’s persuasion will carry greater weight. Id. Standard 4-1.2 cmt.
100. The Ninth Circuit elaborated:
The attorney-client relationship is accorded special protection because of its
impact on the truth-finding process . . . . But representation at trial is without
substance if the defendant does not have confidence in his attorney’s ability to
represent the defendant’s best interests. It is unlikely that a criminal defendant
will have a legal education. He, therefore, will have to rely on his attorney’s
advice for the most basic decisions in a criminal trial whether to plead guilty,
whether to testify, whether to present a defense, and which witnesses to call. If
the defendant does not trust his attorney, he may be unwilling to follow his
attorney’s advice in these most important areas.
Slappy, 649 F.2d at 720.
101. Studies have shown this to be the case. See Marcus T. Boccaccini & Stanley
L. Brodsky, Characteristics of the Ideal Criminal Defense Attorney from the Client’s
Perspective: Empirical Findings and Implications for Legal Practice, 25 LAW &
PSYCHOL. REV. 81, 87 (2001) (finding that the studies show that retained attorneys are
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since the quality of representation for poor criminal defendants in this
country suffers greatly. Many public defenders do not have the time, resources,
or abilities to meet with their clients often, keep them informed, or
develop trust.102 They are underpaid and overworked, and, sadly, many
also do not care.103 Therefore, when an indigent defendant does develop
a working relationship with an appointed attorney, and wishes to keep
that attorney, it should not be easily severed.104
Second, the decision to choose one’s lawyer, or, in this case, to choose
to continue an ongoing relationship without risk of it being severed,
promotes individual autonomy.105 The Supreme Court has recognized
this as a core value in Faretta, for it is the defendant whose freedom is at
stake, and he should have a role in key decisions related to the course
and quality of his defense.106 Courts recognize that autonomy is served

viewed more positively than court-appointed attorneys, who are generally not trusted and
are perceived as representing the state and as inexperienced and overworked).
102. See Alexandra Natapoff, Speechless: The Silencing of Criminal Defendants, 80
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1449 (2005).
For indigent defendants the development of robust communicative
relationships with counsel is difficult if not impossible. In overburdened state
courts, it is not uncommon for a defendant to meet his public defender, hear
about the deal, and decide what to do—all in the span of less than an hour and
within the confines of a court lock-up or hallway while waiting to go into
court.
Id. at 1462.
103. See Richard A. Rosen, Reflections on Innocence, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 237, 253–
54 (“Defendants are not only given bad lawyers, they are tethered to them because
defendants have no right to replace even the most incompetent and unsympathetic
lawyer.”).
104. See Berger, supra note 6, at 50 (“[T]he grim reality of indigents’ pervasive
mistrust of their lawyers . . . should make a court hesitate to compel or condone the
rupture of a good indigent-counsel relationship.”).
105. See Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 268 (1984) (stating that the right
of an accused to retain counsel of his choice “reflects constitutional protection of the
defendant’s free choice independent of concern for the objective fairness of the
proceeding”); Holly, supra note 10, at 188 (stating that the right to counsel of choice
implicates accused’s personal interest in autonomy and the personal right to control
one’s defense).
106. The Second Circuit recognized that:
[T]he defendants’ choice is to be honored out of respect for them as free and
rational beings, responsible for their own fates. . . . The resolve of the
[defendants] to stand before the law together, . . . no less than Faretta’s resolve
to stand before the law entirely alone, is worthy of constitutional protection.
United States v. Curcio, 694 F.2d 14, 25 (2d Cir. 1982) (Friendly, J.). See Morris v.
Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“Given the importance of
counsel to the presentation of an effective defense, it should be obvious that a defendant
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by the nonindigent defendant’s right to counsel of choice.107 Logically,
it is served by any measure of choice given to the indigent defendant.
Because lawyers are not interchangeable, choosing a lawyer can make
all of the difference in the way a case proceeds.108 A client who consciously
chooses or prefers an aggressive litigator may be more likely go to trial
than a client who prefers a lawyer whom he knows gets great deals from
the prosecutor. Regardless of what the defendant knows in advance,
each lawyer will choose her own strategies at every step, as there are
usually multiple possible strategies. Choosing his lawyer may be the
most important choice the defendant will make in the presentation of his
defense.109
Lastly, the right to an ongoing relationship with a lawyer of one’s
choosing promotes the principles of fairness and integrity in the criminal
judicial process. For example, the defendant is more likely to see the
has an interest in his relationship with his attorney. . . . It is the defendant’s interests,
and freedom, which are at stake.”).
107. In dissent in Wheat v. United States, Justice Marshall observed that the right to
counsel of choice sounded in “an appreciation that a primary purpose of the Sixth
Amendment is to grant a criminal defendant effective control over the conduct of his
defense” and “[a]n obviously critical aspect of making a defense [acknowledged in
Faretta] is choosing a person to serve as an assistant and representative.” 486 U.S. 153,
165–66 (1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
108. Third Circuit Judge Higginbotham described the importance of selecting an
attorney as follows:
We would reject reality if we were to suggest that lawyers are a homogenous
group. Attorneys are not fungible, as are eggs, apples and oranges. Attorneys
may differ as to their trial strategy, their oratory style, or the importance they
give to particular legal issues. The differences, all within the range of effective
and competent advocacy, may be important in the development of the defense.
Given this reality, a defendant’s decision to select a particular attorney
becomes critical to the type of defense he will make and thus falls within the
ambit of the sixth amendment.
United States v. Laura, 607 F.2d 52, 56 (3d Cir. 1979). See also Fuller v. Diesslin, 868
F.2d 604, 610 (3d Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 873 (1989) (“The most important
decision a defendant makes in shaping his defense is his selection of an attorney. The
selected attorney is the mechanism through which the defendant will learn of the options
which are available to him.”); United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485, 1502 (10th Cir.
1988) (“A defendant’s right to choose an attorney is a corollary right to decide what type
of defense the accused will present.”); Curcio, 694 F.2d at 24 (recognizing that
defendants who sought joint representation by a single chosen attorney through whom
they had been previously represented were asserting their “right to present their defense
in what they have reasonably concluded to be the most effective fashion . . . .”).
109. As some commentators noted:
Choice of counsel in some cases may be the most important decision the
defendant makes. . . . Because the defendant has to live with the results of
such decisions by counsel, it may be argued that the defendant should be given
an unfettered right to choose counsel on the basis of a right to personal
autonomy . . . .
Peter A. Joy & Kevin C. McMunigal, Client Autonomy and Choice of Counsel, CRIM.
JUST., Fall 2006, at 57, 59.
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process as fair if the judge’s calendar does not prevail over his relationship
with his lawyer.110 Also, allowing the indigent defendant the very limited
tool of choosing to continue with counsel he trusts provides some
equilibrium with the government, which traditionally possesses more
power, more money, and more tools.111
Of course, since the majority of the Court in Slappy appeared to reject
many of these same arguments, as made by the Ninth Circuit and by
concurring Justices Brennan and Marshall, it may seem that the cause is
lost. However, the Court did not rule directly on the issue and merely
rejected in dicta a broader right to “a meaningful attorney-client
relationship.”112 Furthermore, in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, a
different set of Supreme Court Justices put a new spin on the right to
counsel of choice that offers room for a reconsideration of the limited
goal of Joseph Slappy.113
V. REVISITING SLAPPY AFTER GONZALEZ-LOPEZ
On June 26, 2006, the Court decided Gonzalez-Lopez, and the case
made very few ripples in the academic community. Gonzalez-Lopez
would appear to affect only the ten percent of criminal defendants who
retain counsel, and only the small percent of those whose choice of
counsel is erroneously denied.114 However, in penning the opinion for
the Court, Justice Scalia made several declarations about the right to
counsel of choice that may well have a much larger ripple effect.
Cuauhtemoc Gonzalez-Lopez was charged in federal court with
110. Professor Poulin notes that “[c]hanging counsel without the defendant’s
consent reduces the likelihood that the defendant will receive effective assistance, and
will perceive the process as fair.” Poulin, supra note 97, at 1256. This point is underscored
by Professor Garcia:
To a large degree, the defendant’s willingness and ability to acquiesce in the
outcome of the criminal process hinges on his confidence in the efficiency of
trial counsel. Because the Court [in Slappy] refused to acknowledge at least a
“qualified” right of an indigent defendant to continue an existing relationship
with appointed counsel, it further undermined, if not obliterated, any belief in
the legitimacy of the system the accused may have had.
Garcia, supra note 18, at 96–97.
111. See Garcia, supra note 18, at 86 (“This right to retain private counsel is crucial
to the validity of the adversary process because it ensures somewhat of an equilibrium
between the prosecution and the defense.”).
112. Slappy, 461 U.S. at 13–14.
113. 126 S. Ct. 2557 (2006).
114. See Joy & McMunigal, supra note 109, at 57 (providing that public defenders
and other appointed counsel represent approximately ninety percent of criminal defendants).
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conspiracy to deliver more than one hundred kilograms of marijuana.115
Gonzalez-Lopez wanted out-of-state attorney Joseph Low to represent
him. Joseph Low was an award-winning, seasoned defense attorney
known for his aggressive approach to criminal defense work.116 Low
filed a motion for admission pro hac vice, and he affiliated with local
counsel Karl Dickhaus for the limited purpose of handling filings. Dickhaus
was a consumer protection attorney with little criminal experience. The
federal district court erroneously denied Low’s several motions for
admission pro hac vice.117 The case proceeded to trial with Dickhaus as
sole counsel. The court denied Dickhaus’s request to have Low sit at
counsel table with him and ordered Low to sit in the audience and have
no contact with local counsel. The court went so far as to place a United
States Marshal between Low and Dickhaus.118
On appeal, the Government conceded that the defendant was erroneously
denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of his choice.119 The only
questions for the Court were whether the defendant had to show
prejudice from the erroneous denial, as is required under the Strickland
v. Washington analysis,120 and whether the error was subject to harmlessness
review or was in fact structural error amounting to automatic reversal.121
A bare majority of the Court held that prejudice need not be shown and
that the error was structural.122
Justice Scalia’s analysis123 made a major doctrinal shift in the Court’s
jurisprudence on the right to counsel of choice. The Court in Wheat had
said that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel did not guarantee choice,
but only that a trial be fair.124 In other words, the denial of counsel of
first choice would not be violated as long as replacement counsel was
“effective” under Strickland v. Washington’s minimal standards. Justice
Scalia switched this course: “It is true enough that the purpose of the
rights set forth in that Amendment is to ensure a fair trial; but it does not
follow that the rights can be disregarded so long as the trial is, on the
whole, fair.”125 Instead, Justice Scalia gave the right to counsel of choice
115. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. at 2560.
116. Brief for the Respondent at 2, Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557 (No. 05-352),
2006 WL 838892.
117. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. at 2560–61.
118. Id. at 2560.
119. Id. at 2561.
120. 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
121. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. at 2560.
122. As already noted, this holding was not necessarily unexpected. See supra note
10.
123. Justice Scalia was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.
Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. at 2557.
124. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988).
125. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. at 2562.
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its own separate place of distinction within the Sixth Amendment, much as
he did with the Confrontation Clause:126 “The right to select counsel of
one’s choice . . . has never been derived from the Sixth Amendment’s
purpose of ensuring a fair trial. It has been regarded as the root meaning
of the constitutional guarantee.”127 In other words, the Sixth Amendment
originally referred to the man of means’ right to bring a lawyer of his
choosing to court with him.
Justice Scalia went further to explain the consequences of an
erroneous denial of choice: “[T]he Sixth Amendment right to counsel of
choice . . . commands, not that a trial be fair, but that a particular guarantee
of fairness be provided—to wit, that the accused be defended by the
counsel he believes to be the best.”128 Therefore, the deprivation of the
right is complete when the defendant is erroneously denied counsel of
his first choice, regardless of the effectiveness of the representation he
actually received.129 In Justice Scalia’s words, “To argue otherwise is to
confuse the right to counsel of choice—which is the right to a particular
lawyer regardless of comparative effectiveness—with the right to effective

126. Indeed, Justice Scalia did not miss the opportunity to compare his analysis of
the right to counsel of choice with the right to confrontation. Id. (citing Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004)).
127. Id. at 2563 (citing Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159; Andersen v. Treat, 172 U.S. 24
(1898); WILLIAM M. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 18–24, 27–33
(1955)). For a criticism of this point by Justice Scalia, see Paul Alessio Mezzina,
Elevating Choice Over Quality of Representation: United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126
S. Ct. 2557 (2006), 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 451, 454 (2006) (“[T]he supposed right
to counsel of choice was born out of the reality that private retention of counsel was the
only way for many defendants to obtain meaningful legal assistance.”). See also id. at
456 (“[T]he text, structure, and history of the Amendment suggest a right to obtain a
certain fixed quantum of legal representation by private retention.”).
128. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. at 2562.
129. The reason that Justice Scalia finds that prejudice need not be shown reflects
the importance of the defendant’s autonomous choice:
Different attorneys will pursue different strategies with regard to investigation
and discovery, development of the theory of defense, selection of the jury,
presentation of the witnesses, and style of witness examination and jury
argument. And the choice of attorney will affect whether and on what terms
the defendant cooperates with the prosecution, plea bargains, or decides
instead to go to trial. In light of these myriad aspects of representation, the
erroneous denial of counsel bears directly on the “framework within which the
trial proceeds,” or indeed on whether it proceeds at all. It is impossible to
know what different choices the rejected counsel would have made, and then
to quantify the impact of those different choices on the outcome of the
proceedings.
Id. at 2564 (citation omitted).
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counsel—which imposes a baseline requirement of competence on whatever
lawyer is chosen or appointed.”130
As expansive as his language is, Justice Scalia noted for the record
that the right to counsel of choice does not extend to defendants who
require counsel to be appointed for them.131 He referred to Slappy as
representing a “trial court’s wide latitude in balancing the right to
counsel of choice . . . against the demands of its calendar.”132 Of course,
as the Ninth Circuit and Justice Brennan noted in Slappy, the trial court
in Slappy never balanced any “right” against its calendar, having
recognized no right and not having made an inquiry into the amount of
time Goldfine would be unavailable.133
Nonetheless, once again, the Court was not presented with the
question of whether there is a Sixth Amendment right to an ongoing
attorney-client relationship, and so it remains an issue to be decided.
However, by enshrining the right to counsel of choice in its own place
among Sixth Amendment rights and disaggregating it from the right to
mere effective assistance of counsel, Justice Scalia gives the issue new
life. If the core of the right is choice, and not effectiveness, and if it is so
fundamental that it leads to automatic reversal when ignored, then the
right is more robust than previously acknowledged.
First, for nonindigent defendants, lower courts must recognize that
increased weight must be given to the right to counsel of choice when
balancing it against governmental interests. While the government
surely has powerful interests in ethical and just proceedings such that,
for example, a defendant should not be represented by a person who is
not a lawyer or by an attorney with an active conflict,134 the court’s
interest in expeditious proceedings is quite different. The courts should
grant a request for a continuance to accommodate chosen counsel’s
schedule or illness, unless to do so would create a manifest injustice.
Manifest injustice would not include a reasonable delay of trial, nor
would it include a delay of justice for the victim or the victim’s family.
While the victim’s interests are an important governmental concern, they
cannot outweigh the defendant’s fundamental constitutional right to be
represented by the attorney he chose to represent him.135
130. Id. at 2563.
131. Id. at 2565.
132. Id. at 2565–66.
133. See Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 25–26 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring);
Slappy v. Morris, 649 F.2d 718, 721–22 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1981).
134. The word “active” is meant to distinguish it from the kind of distant potential
conflict at issue in Wheat. See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 155 (1988).
135. In Morris v. Slappy, Chief Justice Burger criticized the Ninth Circuit for
creating the “novel idea” of a Sixth Amendment right to a meaningful attorney-client
relationship and ignoring the victim’s rights; he argued that allowing for an automatic
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Second, if the right to counsel of choice is fundamental to the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, it should be extended to indigent defendants,
at least with respect to a right to choose to continue an ongoing attorneyclient relationship. This should not only include the continuation of a
relationship within a trial, but between trials. In other words, given the
importance of trust, autonomy, and fairness to the right to counsel of
choice, the court should appoint the same attorney to represent an indigent
defendant in his subsequent cases, if the defendant so chooses.136 The
continuity of the relationship would enhance perceptions of fairness,
decrease start-up costs, and ensure the best possible representation from
the client’s perspective.137
Again, here, the court should not be able to sever the relationship over
the defendant’s objection in the absence of manifest injustice, and particularly
not for purposes of expeditious calendaring. In Slappy, Justice Brennan’s
concurrence was a bit too vague when it acknowledged that a right to
continued representation may be qualified by a balancing inquiry between
the defendant’s interest and “the public’s interest in the efficient and
expeditious administration of criminal justice.”138 Certainly, if Goldfine
was going to be unavailable for a year, then Joseph Slappy’s preference
could not be accommodated. However, the primacy of the constitutional
interest in the continued relationship would outweigh any reasonable
delay.
Joseph Slappy had the right instincts. He believed that the law contrived
against him, as he was rushed to trial with a lawyer he had just met. No
matter how heinous the crime, an indigent defendant has a constitutional
right to be assisted in facing those charges. That assistance is worthless

reversal in the case would have required the victim to “undergo[] the ordeal of yet a third
trial in this case.” 461 U.S. 1, 14 (1983). The first two trials were the result of a hung
jury on some counts, and, in any case, one of the costs of violating the fundamental
constitutional rights of a criminal defendant is that victims have to undergo new trials.
136. See, e.g., Davis v. State, 403 S.E.2d 800, 801 (Ga. 1991); Amadeo v. State,
384 S.E.2d 181, 183 (Ga. 1989) (appointing, upon defendant’s request, the attorney who
had represented defendant in his original capital trial now being retried); Harris v.
Superior Court, 567 P.2d 750, 758–59 (Cal. 1977) (holding that the trial court abused
discretion in denying the request of defendant, member of a radical group, for
appointment of two attorneys who had represented members of the same radical group in
prior criminal proceedings and had established familiarity and trust).
137. See Holly, supra note 10, at 207 (“[A] greater stability and trust between
counsel and client will cause a proportional decline in the need for pre-trial motions for
continuances and post-conviction claims of ineffective assistance.”).
138. Slappy, 461 U.S. at 25 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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to the defendant if he cannot establish a working relationship with the
lawyer appointed to represent him—he cannot make his defense. While
it may be more than the Supreme Court can bite off to say that the Sixth
Amendment includes a positive right to a “meaningful attorney-client
relationship,” it is surely palatable to conclude that the fundamental right
to counsel of choice includes the right of any criminal defendant to
continue an ongoing attorney-client relationship. If the opportunity arises,
the Court should think hard about what Cuauhtemoc Gonzalez-Lopez
has to offer Joseph Slappy.
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